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Abstract: 
This paper highlights civil society actors involved in collecting and monitoring the tax 
obligations of mining companies in Cameroon. To achieve this goal, we used data 
collection from leaders or members of civil society companies through semi-structured 
interviews using a questionnaire developed for this purpose on the one hand and the tools 
of game theory and sociology of behavior on the other hand. The study shows that there 
are two civil society organization groups (CSOs) in the extractive sector: CSO leaders 
and CSO followers. They are all grouped together in the "Cameroon Coalition Publish 
What You Pay". They are characterized by a lack of specialization, a strong identity 
withdrawal and a lack of expertise in public finances because the promoters are recruited 
in various sectors of the working life. One could speak of an inadequacy training job and 
a game indefinitely repeated between the actors. 
Keywords: Engagement, Citizenship, Training, Governance, Game Theory, Cameroon 
 
Résumé : 
Le présent papier met en exergue les acteurs de la société civile impliqués dans la collecte 
et le suivi des obligations fiscales des compagnies minières au Cameroun. Pour atteindre 
cet objectif, nous avons eu recours à une collecte des données auprès des leaders ou 
membres des entreprises de la société civile au travers d’entretiens semi-directifs à l’aide 
d’un questionnaire élaboré à cet effet d’une part et aux outils de théorie de jeux et de 
sociologie du comportement d’autre part. L’étude montre qu’il existe deux groupes 
d’organisation de la société civile (OSC) dans le secteur extractif : les OSC leaders et les 
OSC suiveurs. Elles sont toutes regroupées au sein de la « Coalition Camerounaise 
Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez ». Elles se caractérisent par une absence de spécialisation, un 
fort repli identitaire et un manque d’expertise dans les finances publiques car les 
promoteurs se recrutent dans divers secteurs de la vie active. On pourrait parler d’une 
inadéquation formation emploi et d’un jeu indéfiniment répété entre les acteurs. 
Mots Clés : Engagement, Citoyenneté, Formation, Gouvernance, Théorie de jeux, 
Cameroun 
 
 
3 
Introduction 
   
Cameroon, Africa in "miniature", has a subsoil too rich. It has a minimum of fifty-two 
(52) types of mineral resources or mineral targets. Among them industrial rocks and 
minerals, diamond, iron, bauxite, gold, rutile, marble, pozzolans, nepheline syenite, 
tungsten, cobalt-nickel, brines, siliceous sand, tin, limestone, lateritic clays, uranium, oil, 
gas, etc. . Currently, the country has about 35 mining areas. According to the 
government, these mining areas are exploited by many multinationals. 
However, the most exploited natural resource remains and remains oil. In view of its 
contribution in the budget for the economic, political and social development of the 
country. Since its introduction in 2008, the share of oil revenues has increased sharply. 
To be at 718 billion FCFA. For a growth of the oil GDP of 3.5% against -7.3% in 20112. 
In general, the table in the appendix tells us that the contribution of extractive industries 
to the economy is important. This means that it is a very important sub-sector for the 
economic and social development of Cameroon. In 2011 revenues from mining extraction 
amounted to 678 billion against 555 in 2010 and 580 in 2009. This indicates an increase 
in revenues and, in turn, the share of these revenues in the overall income of the State. . 
These figures would therefore explain the attitude of the Cameroonian authorities, who 
are pushing for flexible legislation for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector. 
Given that, in theory, there are many spillovers from FDI in host countries. FDI has 
effects on employment and poverty reduction, technology transfer and human capital 
formation, changes in domestic investment, exports and foreign trade. 
 
The fiscal obligations of the mining sector are contained in the legislative provisions laid 
down by the Cameroonian legislator, namely: the mining code (2001); its implementing 
decree (2002) and its amendment (2010); the general tax code (2010); the law on local 
taxation (2009); the mining convention (2010); and lastly, the 2014 decree. It is also 
important to specify that the finance law sets each year the tax rates of the various mining 
companies according to the type of mining activity. Reading the Mining Code for 
example, we realize that tax benefits are granted to mining companies in the form of 
exemptions. This during the pre-production phases namely recognition, exploration, 
                                                          
2 Pour plus d’informations cf,  Rapport sur la Situation et les Perspectives Economiques, Sociales et 
Financières de la Nation, MINFI/DAE, LOI DE FINANCES 2014. 
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research and even construction. Nevertheless, many of these exemptions are maintained 
during the production phase. The reason so far mentioned by the Government of the 
Republic is the concern to develop the Cameroonian mining sector by creating a business 
environment conducive to investment including FDI. When a search permit or an 
operating permit is issued, the company is required to pay a deposit guaranteeing the 
performance of its activities. The amount and terms of payment of this deposit are set by 
the decree implementing the mining code. 
The implementing decree3 sets fixed payment terms, specifically for mining and 
industrial quarrying, as well as the terms and conditions for the payment of the surface 
royalty. 
Other provisions are provided for local taxation to support the decentralization process 
and promote community development. This is also part of the provisions of the CGI 
2010. It is also the title of his third book and is also the subject of a particular law. It 
covers all the duties and taxes the proceeds of which are allocated to the decentralized 
territorial authorities, in this case the urban and rural communes, as well as the urban 
communities. These include municipal taxes, communal surcharges on state taxes, 
municipal taxes, regional taxes and other types of levies provided for by law. 
In this sector, taxes are collected by the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Technological 
Development at the decentralized level, the Ministry of Finance at the decentralized level 
or the central body in charge of taxation in Yaoundé and transferred thereafter treasure. 
The process varies slightly depending on whether the project is an artisanal mine, a 
quarry mine, a water source or an industrial mine. The fixed duties and superficial fees 
paid by the companies are made on the basis of vouchers issued by the Ministry of Mines, 
Water and Energy. To improve governance of public finances from this sector, the 
country signed up for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2005 and 
became a Compliant Country on 17 October 2013. The EITI has three objectives: (i) to 
ensure the transparency of payments and revenues generated by extractive industries, (ii) 
to make this information accessible to civil society and the general public, and (iii) to 
promote the proper use of this wealth. This initiative combats corruption and 
embezzlement, so that the wealth generated is a driver of economic growth and 
contributes to sustainable development on the one hand and to poverty reduction on the 
other. In other words, this initiative promotes governance that is pro-poor, vulnerable or 
                                                          
3 Confère annexe I 
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disadvantaged. However, despite this status, the issue of transparency in the exploitation 
of mineral resources remains and remains current as well as the management of revenues 
from this exploitation. 
This result is the result of numerous reforms undertaken by the national authorities 
supported by civil society organizations (CSOs) in a country where protests were 
severely repressed in the 1980s and early 1990s despite the adoption of law on freedom 
of association and protest. These CSOs denounce poor fiscal governance, ignorance of 
the legislation governing the mining sector by citizens, opaque management of royalty 
and other taxes in the mining sector, the absence of a mining cadastre that could provide 
information on areas operated by each company, the overflow of tax exemptions present 
in the mining sector, the confidentiality clause regarding contracts in the sector. These 
organizations campaign for the publication of taxes paid by each mining company and oil 
field4. 
 
In the light of the foregoing, this paper seeks to answer the following question: what is 
the impact of citizen mobilizations on the governance of public finances in the mining 
sector in Cameroon? 
It is a question of highlighting the role of the civil society in the citizen engagement of 
the populations for more transparency in the management of the public finances in the 
mining sector. 
Specifically, it will be: 
 give the profile of CSOs to mining sector; 
 appreciate the interactions between these civil society companies; 
 highlight the level of training of the main actors as well as the strategies 
implemented to strengthen their capacities; 
 appreciate their relationship with the state; 
 highlight their mobilization or advocacy strategies and their source of funding; 
 appreciate the internal governance that prevails in these structures. 
 
Historically, studies of civil society date back to the work of Aristotle in the 4th century, 
which shows that man is by nature an animal made for civil society. He is followed by 
Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century; Rousseau, Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx in the 
                                                          
4 Rio Del Rey, Lobeke, etc… 
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18th century who use the term civil society to describe the area of private interests and 
trade of the bourgeoisie. This concept resurfaced in the second half of the 20th century in 
Latin America to designate oppositions to authoritarian rule (Cazabat, 2015). 
This new form of social movement is distinguished from the "old social movements" 
observed in the 19th century by C. Tilly as a particular form of collective action based on 
class conflict (bourgeois class and proletarian class), a subject on which is abundantly 
depleted Karl Max. According to his analyzes, the structuring of classes in each society 
gives the grid of mobilizations. 
According to the literature, this mode of claim was born with the advent of capitalism, in 
other words transformations of the modes of production. C. Tilly also considers the 
formation process of the Nation-State as an explanatory factor for this particular form of 
collective action that is historically and spatially localized. These two major processes 
and in particular the nation-state formation process created new opportunities to mobilize 
and mobilization targets. These two processes have therefore impacted collective action. 
They transformed the organization of society. 
These great transformations then produced transformations in the repertoires of collective 
action. For C. Tilly, collective action has moved from a "reactive" directory to a 
"proactive" directory; that is, citizens do not simply react to decisions made by local or 
other authorities but organize themselves to take proactive initiatives. 
In Africa collective actions, which are different from those observed in the rest of the 
world, are linked to the advent of democracy in the early 1990s. However, there existed 
before that date modes of "undeclared associations" of a community nature in the form of 
secret ritual societies or self-help groups promoting the interests of a small group of 
insiders. This is the case of Bamileke companies, groups of women's associations. Today, 
with globalization, the dismantling of CSOs on the continent is at the center of debates on 
democratic transitions and consolidations. Despite the fact that the approaches are 
different from one country to another. 
 
Collective action that can be understood as a "concerted action" that "involves a 
conscious intention" exists in a temporal and spatial context, is ordered in organizational 
form and has multiple aims in which the law plays a fundamental role (Cefaï , 2007). 
This notion therefore refers to two fundamental criteria, namely the "intentional act-
together" and the logic of claim, defense of material interest or cause. How does this type 
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of action work? How is it developing? How does it end? In theory, collective action can 
be triggered by citizen discontent, which is the result of many frustrations. These 
discontents can be defined, created and manipulated by cause entrepreneurs and the 
organization as presented by John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald cited by Oberson 
(2009). However, these mobilizations can only flourish if the group is well structured or 
well organized (Neveu, 2002). The aggregation of resources is therefore not the keystone 
for the success of these mobilizations but the organization of resources in terms of time 
and money. This reasoning has its origin in the thesis of the professional organization. 
This thesis is also defended by Oberschall (1973) who states that "there can be no social 
movement except where there is a social organization". According to him, mobilization 
can only come about in particular conditions. The basic condition is the fact that there are 
particular links between the protesters and a lack of special links between the protesters 
and the state. However, what determines the militant commitment? 
The search for belonging to a group can justify the activist commitment of individuals 
according to the psychosocial theory of Maslow's5 needs. This sense of belonging is the 
third need on Maslow's scale of needs. 
In economics, researchers rely on two notions: individual rationality and selective 
incentives to explain activist engagement. Selective incentives are defined as all the 
benefits that the organization grants to its members or leaders who mobilize such as 
continuing education, insurance, etc. These advantages lead to lower participation costs 
and can generate a "collective rationality" opposed to individual rationality that is based 
on the satisfaction of the individual. In terms of individual economic behavior, 
marginalist analysis defines rationality by seeking maximum satisfaction at the least cost. 
It is the character of homo-oeconomicus that is perfectly informed and autonomous, 
maximizing both its pleasures and minimizing its pain, suffering or costs. This justifies 
the participation, non-participation or free rider behavior of certain citizens who would 
benefit from the mobilization. This calculating behavior of economic agents has been 
approached by many researchers such as Arrow (1986) and Stiglitz (1991). In addition to 
understanding the behavior of the agents, it is also possible to summon the game theory 
including cooperative games and non-cooperative games because the agents can agree to 
                                                          
5 Degenne, A. et Y. Lemel (2006), Sociologie des comportements intentionnels. Economica, Collection 
Economie et Statistiques Avancées. 
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participate in the mobilization or not to participate. This decision to participate or not is 
taken without the knowledge of other actors. 
 
This cooperation also finds an explanation from a sociological point of view when we 
summon Axelrod's "Folk Theorem" or "Theorem of Everyone" (1984) 6. The researcher 
shows through his theory that actors have an interest in cooperating. According to this 
work, these actors can cooperate durably to reach the advantageous position as many 
times as they want. Hence the notion of play indefinitely repeated. 
So how do you make sure that people do not behave like free riders? How to make sure 
they do not have opportunistic behavior? To provide solutions to this organizational 
dilemma, Ménard (1994) draws on Williamson's (1975) transaction cost theory. Based on 
this theory, it demonstrates that cooperation is a strategy to minimize the costs of 
coordination. 
 
This calculating behavior is also evoked in the extension of James Coleman's theory of 
relational choice to explain civic engagement (Lazega, 2003). As such, he distinguishes 
four central elements of rational choice theory from neoclassical economics and four 
others from sociology. Those derived from economic theory include methodological 
individualism, the principle of maximizing the utility function as the spring of individual 
action, the concept of the social optimum, or Pareto optimum7, and finally the concept of 
Nash8 equilibrium. The four elements from sociology include: The idea that the 
maximizing actor can gain utility by giving others control over resources to which they 
are entitled, their own action and even their rights. Social or organizational hierarchies, 
power structures, would come from this delegation. The existence of a specifically social 
capital9; the social origin of rights10; the institutions11. 
                                                          
6 Voir Degenne et Lemel (2006, P.49) 
7 It is the idea that at the level of the whole system there is at least one social state such that no other state 
can improve the income of one actor without injuring another actor 
8 This is the idea that there is a state of the system where no actor acting individually can improve his 
situation alone; so it's a situation where you have no reason to act alone 
9 Coleman means any aspect of the formal or informal social organization that constitutes a productive 
resource for one or more actors: eg strong social norms, a well-knit family, a group of competent 
colleagues, a large network friends. 
10 Coleman explains that in a given context, an action is rational only in terms of a specific distribution of 
rights - which are themselves defined as exchangeable resources in a rights market, a bit like " options' in 
the financial world. 
 
 
9 
In Cameroon, collective mobilizations are not only linked to the advent of democracy but 
also to the advent of the law N ° 90/053 of December 19, 1990 on freedom of association 
in the early 90s, despite the absence of an implementing decree specifying the eligibility 
criteria for non-governmental organization status. From that moment on, we have seen 
the emergence of organizations of all kinds, from groups of initiatives common to the 
non-governmental organization. These organizations, which are recruited in all sectors of 
life in Cameroon, namely health, education, extractive, agricultural, political, play a 
political, economic and social role, especially with regard to the improvement of the 
living conditions of the populations. After many sociologists, political anthropologists, 
etc. 
However, these "enterprises of society that influence power" saw their role strengthened 
with the creation in 1998 by the Government of the Republic of Cameroon of the 
National Governance Program12. This program, which was implemented between 2001 
and 2010, aimed to involve the private sector and civil society in Cameroon's economic 
and social development strategy following the withdrawal of the State whose resources 
were no longer sufficient to satisfy the basic needs of the people. It was mainly a matter 
of providing better guidance for CSO actions by integrating them into the various 
programs developed by the Government: "It became clear that for the private sector and 
civil society to play the roles that were now assigned to them, their actions must be part 
of a strategy for economic and social development, a strategy that only the State can 
define ". This program should also allow the establishment of a national network of CSOs 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization 
(MINATD). 
This shows that the concept is not new in the country. Many authors have also tried to 
grasp the concept. They also demonstrate that civil society is an instrument for combating 
poverty and controlling government action. According to Tamba (2004), CSOs are 
"structured groupings of individuals with the aim of promoting ends that are not 
necessarily personal interests; protection of the environment, fight against poverty, 
defense of human rights ... ". In the same vein, other researchers show that CSOs in 
Cameroon constitute a device for the fight against poverty. This is the case of Mathias E. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 For the author, they translate the constraints of the system to guide the individual action and, thereby, 
coordinate these behaviors to make the collective action possible and, at the same time, produce gains by 
aggregation at the systemic level. 
12 National Program of Good Governance 2006-2010, Prime Minister's Office. 
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Owona Nguini, Olinga D., Jean Gatsi13 and J. C. Amougou Owono. In the same vein, 
Cazabat (2015) highlights the positive role of CSOs in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals in the country. This is the first analysis that scientifically establishes 
a real link between CSOs and economic and social development. It also indicates that the 
distribution of CSOs is geographically unequal. The Central Region alone has three times 
more CSOs than any other region in the country. Joseph Stiglitz14 in his book also 
recognizes that these companies are major players in development. It is for this reason 
that he affirms I quote: to fight effectively against Ebola, it would have been necessary to 
trust public or associative institutions ". 
In view of its positive impact on development, the Cameroonian authorities give it an 
important place in the Strategy Paper for Growth and Employment (DSCE) published in 
August 2009. Four functions are recognized by civil society in this document (Article III, 
5.3): 
 provide social services for the fight against poverty and social advancement, 
including marginalized groups; 
 to serve as a moral authority for the safeguarding and promotion of the national 
cultural heritage, the promotion of common values, the fight against centrifugal 
forces; 
 to act as a crucible for participation and social mobilization for the integration 
of the productive forces and democratization in a context of decentralization; 
 Have a watch activity for the defense of human rights in general, and in 
particular those of workers, women, children, minorities, etc. and for expanding 
the process of democratization. 
To characterize the CSOs involved in the collection, monitoring and construction of 
mining taxation and to identify the interactions between them, we first drew up a list of 
CSOs working in the extractive sector in the country. This information was collected on 
the official website of EITI Cameroon, the official website of the Ministry of Mines, 
Industry and Technological Development (MINMIDT), the official website of the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization ( MINATD), the official 
website of the Ministry of Finance (MINFI), and consulting the list of projects funded by 
the European Union Civil Society Support Program. 
                                                          
13  Gatsi, J., la société civile au Cameroun, presses universitaires d’Afrique 
14 Stiglitz, J. E. (2015), la Grande fracture : les sociétés inégalitaires et ce que nous pouvons faire changer, 
ed. les liens qui libèrent. 
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Then, we conducted a qualitative study in the form of interviews with the leaders or 
members of this association using a questionnaire developed for this purpose. This 
interview guide provided information on the profile of leaders or members, the 
organization of the association, social dynamics, the functioning of the CSO, its 
intervention strategies, partnerships and internal governance. 
In this research, the characterization of the actors is based on the stakeholder theory of 
Mitchell et al (1997) 15. This makes it possible to identify and prioritize the stakeholders 
involved in the consultation process. Three attributes are taken into account in this 
exercise namely the power of the actor (his ability to impose his will on others), the 
legitimacy of the actor granted by the stakeholders of the consultation process and the 
urgency of the demands of the the actor (the pressure that he is likely to exert in the 
process of concertation because of the stakes that this one represents for him). The basic 
concepts used by these latter come mainly from Weberian sociology16. 
This paper is organized in three sections after the introduction which provides general 
information on the extractive sector in Cameroon. Section I, which takes a snapshot of 
the actors involved in the governance of public finances in the mining sector; section II, 
which provides a global understanding of the logic underlying the construction of 
collective action by focusing on the individual and structural characteristics of the actors; 
Section III which focuses on CSO achievements or performance and funding 
mechanisms. 
 
I. Actors Involved the Governance of Public Finance in the Mining Sector in 
Cameroon   
According to Brullot et al (2014), the characterization of actors is based on an actorial 
approach. In other words, an approach aimed at comprehending comprehensively the 
logic underlying the construction of collective action by focusing on the individual and 
structural characteristics of the actors (inherent to the person and the organization to 
which they belong). , its function, its mission, its competences, the rules that govern it, 
etc.). The objective is to understand the specificities of the set of key actors present on the 
territory likely to generate the commitment of the citizens in the monitoring of the 
management of the mining royalty at the municipal and national level. In Cameroon, two 
                                                          
15 Cité par Brullot et al (2014) 
16 Cf Weber (1971) 
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categories of actors are involved in the collection and monitoring of the tax obligations of 
mining companies, namely public sector actors (Government), parliamentarians and 
local, national and international civil society organizations for their role of control, 
monitoring and watch. 
A. Typology and Objectives of CSOs in the Extractive Sector 
A plurality of CSOs is involved in collective mobilizations around collecting and 
monitoring the tax obligations of mining companies. These can be classified into two 
major groups. 
The first can be called a "group of leaders". We find here, the Network against Hunger 
(RELUFA), the Center for Environment and Development (CED), the Global Youth 
Dynamics (DMJ), the African Regional Center for Endogenous and Community 
Development (CRADEC) 17 , National Service Justice and Peace (SNJP), Transparency 
International-Cameroon. Leaders are referred to because of their strong field presence, 
structuring, and the close relationships that organizations in this group have with 
international non-governmental organizations. As far as structuring is concerned, it can 
be seen, for example, that these CSOs have relays in the field and that they are organized 
in a network or belong to several networks. 
Partnerships between these CSOs could also be highlighted to justify this leadership. One 
could mention the collaboration between RELUFA and CED. The latter are conducting 
studies together to denounce the illegal exploitation of certain minerals in the country, 
particularly in the Eastern region; sensitize the authorities on the impacts of artisanal 
mineral mining on the environment, health, safety and hygiene of workers or land-use 
conflicts in the country. 
Moreover, one would evoke the fact that these are the founding structures of the 
"Cameroon Coalition Publish What You Pay". 
 
The second group consists of "follower" CSOs, namely the Center for Education Training 
and Support for Development Initiatives in Cameroon (CEFAID), the NGO Development 
Without Borders (DSF) 18, the Watch Cell and Protecting Victims of Figuil's Mining 
Activities (Celpro-Figuil), African Traditional Leaders Network for Environmental 
                                                          
17 CRADEC is an association from the legal point of view, development support created by a group of 
friends in 1996. 
18 Decentralized NGO with offices outside the city of Yaounde 
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Conservation and Sustainable Management of Congo Basin Ecosystems (RecTrad), 
Cameroon Action Foundation Rationalized and Environmental Training (FOCARFE), 
Acting For Guaranteeing Governance (AGAGES), Action Research Environment 
Cameroon (ERA). 
These CSOs are all grouped together in a coalition known as "Cameroon Coalition 
Publish What You Pay", with the aim of pooling efforts and resources for more effective 
control of extractive companies' payments. However, some of them are members of other 
networks. The DMJ for example member of several networks including the network liver 
and liberation, Cameroon Action of Small Arm, Cameroon Association for Interreligious 
Dialogue (ACCADI), Civic Service for Peace (SCP). 
Overall, these CSOs pursue a common goal of improving the governance of public 
finance in the mining sector. 
In addition, other objectives are pursued, such as improving the well-being of the 
community. On the one hand, this means fighting against poverty, fighting famine, 
preserving the environment, and managing forests sustainably and transparently. On the 
other hand, they build capacity of local communities or youth; they encourage youth 
leadership; they make advocacy, budget monitoring; they contribute to the development 
of local and indigenous communities respecting their environment and culture. In view of 
the foregoing, one could speak of "opportunism" because these corporate enterprises have 
many interests. Their behavior is no different from nonprofit structures whose purpose is 
to make profits. 
They advocate for more transparency in the extractive industries, for more justice and tax 
equity in the extractive sector. For a tax system that benefits everyone, especially those 
living near the mining area, has positive implications for the reduction of inequalities 
with their corollary poverty, can enable the realization of human rights, and ensure the 
contextual implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
This tax fairness goes through the fight against tax evasion and tax evasion, practiced by 
foreign mining companies. These actors are financially, technically and materially 
supported by the German Cooperation, the French Cooperation and the European Union 
for the promotion of the initiative of transparency in the extractive industries with the 
populations through campaigns of sensitization, films or telefilms, radio and television 
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debates on the one hand and training on the requirements and stages of the EITI process 
on the other. 
In addition, many efforts and reforms have been made over the past eight (08) years. For 
example, in 2015, Cameroon published "the list of actual owners of numerous licenses", 
which is a notorious step forward in monitoring the activities of mining companies, 
particularly with regard to the monitoring of payments and sub-national transfers that are 
one of the forms of financial, fiscal, quasi-fiscal, social and infrastructural compensation 
to which the surrounding populations and communities are entitled in order to improve 
their living conditions. Especially when we know that the rural areas are the poorest as 
indicated by the work of the National Institute of Statistics (2002, 2008). 
 
These social payments or social expenditures are contributions to local or regional 
governments, communities, NGOs, or other organizations in their area of activity that 
extractive industries often contribute. 
This, in accordance with the decree n ° 2014/1882 / PM of the 04 July 2014 modifying 
and completing certain provisions of the decree n ° 2002/648 / PM of March 26th, 2002 
fixing the modalities of application of the law n ° 001 of April 16th, 2001 bearing mining 
code. This decree stipulates that "the quotas of the neighboring populations and of the 
commune are paid into the account of the municipal receiver territorially competent. The 
other shares are allocated in the budget accounts provided for this purpose. Many 
researchers show that increased decentralization and good practice of democracy can 
improve the living conditions of local populations. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) show in 
their book that the transfer of funds at the local level combined with a good practice of 
democracy contributes to the implementation of pro-poor actions. In other words, actions 
that benefit the poor. They demonstrate this by drawing on examples from Brazil, India 
and Indonesia that local governance19 and more specifically the governance of villagers 
or communities can reduce poverty. This mode of governance, which has an impact on 
health expenditure, for example, makes it possible to improve the well-being of 
communities or the collective well-being. This method of management makes it possible 
                                                          
19 Local governance is when grassroots people assess their needs, vote their budget, and choose projects for 
implementation. 
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to fight corruption effectively and to make a citizen follow-up of public investments that 
are in the general interest. 
These developments simply show that participation in politics and governance is an 
integral part of quality of life. 
To support the State in this initiative dedicated to local governance, the Cameroonian 
civil society through the DMJ has developed the Citizen Monitoring of Public 
Investments of the State abbreviated the SCIPE. This tool or tool allows the citizen to 
ensure that the investments planned in his locality are made in the quantity and quality 
provided, with the resources allocated for this purpose. This mechanism promotes 
accountability (reissue of accounts). It can promote local democracy and multi-
stakeholder dialogue structured between the public sector, the private sector, the 
population or civil society. This organization of moral elite as stated by its Executive 
Secretary, responsible for communication and mobilization, I quote: 
 "The DMJ is not a mass organization, it is rather a moral elite organization that fights 
for the moral rearmament of citizens including youth. We mean by moral rearmament, 
taking responsibility for any event, being able to say I worked but I did not have a formal 
contract ", employs a strategy that consists in" putting posters in places of population 
groupings. Most often these are public places such as schools, hospitals, markets, 
communal services. These places are determined in concert with the young people of 
each commune”. 
The establishment of a Committee, namely the EITI Committee composed of public 
sector administrations that report revenue, extractive companies reporting payments, the 
EITI international secretariat that monitors compliance with the standard and the civil 
society that analyzes the reports, discusses and debates, thus constitutes a major 
implication of the mobilizations observed until the beginning of the 2000s around 
transparency in the extractive sector. This committee is a framework for improving public 
finance governance in the extractive sector. 
B. General Characteristics of CSOs: Date of Creation, Location, Leader 
Profiles, Organization and Relationships with Populations 
The observation of the results of the survey carried out, teaches us that all of the Civil 
Society Organizations interviewed are based in Yaounde, the political and administrative 
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capital of the country, which concentrates almost all economic, political and 
administrative activities. However, 2 / 5th of these CSOs have dismemberments at the 
deconcentrated level. 
About 90% of CSOs interviewed were created in the mid-1990s with the advent of 
democracy, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. They have a complete 
address: post office box, e-mail, telephone number, fax, etc. 
Their leaders are mostly graduates of higher education. Some are graduates in 
Communication, Agronomy, Law, but not in public finance. This indicates a training-
employment mismatch because almost all of them do not have public finance skills. This 
shows that a real problem of skills arises in these structures because this sector requires a 
specialization in public finance including mining taxation. This denotes a training-
employment mismatch sometimes criticized by them. In some cases, these are former 
state agents, such as the management team of the African Regional Center for 
Endogenous and Community Development (CRADEC). It consists of 90% former rural 
development officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development on the one 
hand and former executives (teacher) of the Ministry of Secondary Education on the other 
hand. With regard to the DMJ, CED and RELUFA, these are independent consultants 
working to raise awareness because "ignorance is what breeds corruption and weakness 
in the face of the state" says the executive secretary of the DMJ. 
These leaders all claim not to have close relations with the ruling class on the one hand 
and not to belong to any political party. This is staggering to the extent that we know the 
tricks of the party to provide or the regime in place. This one tries to phagocyte any 
movement of actors who can harm the interests of the power or the administration. For 
that, it uses all the means of repression or dissuasion possible. 
These leaders denounce the pressures they face as well as the reprisals that may occur in 
the course of their activities. Some of them are sometimes held in abusive and arbitrary 
detention. The duration of these detentions depends on the reason displayed by the public 
authorities. 
We also note that the withdrawal of identity / community is very advanced within these 
associations. More than 60% of the organizations surveyed have a strong grass field fiber 
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like the DMJ and the CED. Others, a fiber beti is the case of CRADEC. To realize this, 
just look at the list of members. The identity withdrawal is almost natural among Africans 
as Rossatanga-Rignault (2012) points out. This withdrawal of identity is a weapon that 
can be used to defend against the foreigner on the one hand and political slogan to claim 
the participation of the ethnic group, the tribe or the clan in sharing the national cake on 
the other hand. As for CSOs, this withdrawal of identity makes it possible to guard 
against all aggression and betrayal because, as an African saying goes, "one feels 
comfortable and safe only when one is surrounded by one's family". 
Certains dirigeants de ces organisations usent de leur capital social. En économie, le 
capital social d’un individu peut être définit comme étant une ressource sociale, issue des 
interactions culturelles et/ou structurelles avec d’autres individus, capable de générer des 
externalités durables qui affectent la situation économique de ceux-ci. Ainsi, les 
solidarités sociales, ethniques ou familiales sont de puissants facteurs de lutte contre la 
pauvreté. A l’inverse, leur disparition ou leur inexistence transcrite en exclusion, peuvent 
s’avérer comme une cause toute aussi puissante d’appauvrissement 
Toutefois, pour être membre de certaines de ces associations comme la DMJ, il faudrait 
que votre volonté ou engagement militant soit éprouvé. Le processus de recrutement dans 
cette organisation commence par le bénévolat ensuite on passe au volontariat après une 
compétition entre les bénévoles. D’après le Secrétaire exécutif de ladite structure, ce type 
de procédé est un proxy du service militaire. A ce titre, il affirme « que tous les 
camerounais qui aspirent à la fonction publique devraient faire le service militaire qui 
est une sorte de bénévolat et de volontariat. Ils deviendront des serviteurs et non ceux qui 
se servent».  
Au CRADEC, l’adhésion est assujettie à une étude de dossier et est conditionné au 
paiement des frais de membre de l’association comme c’est le cas dans la majeure partie 
des associations. 
Some leaders of these organizations use their social capital. In economics, the social 
capital of an individual can be defined as a social resource, resulting from cultural and / 
or structural interactions with other individuals, capable of generating lasting externalities 
that affect the economic situation of these individuals. Thus, social, ethnic or family 
solidarity are powerful factors in the fight against poverty. Conversely, their 
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disappearance or non-existence transcribed into exclusion may prove to be an equally 
powerful cause of impoverishment. 
However, to be a member of some of these associations like the DMJ, it would be 
necessary that your will or militant commitment is tested. The recruitment process in this 
organization starts with volunteering and then volunteers after a competition between 
volunteers. According to the Executive Secretary of this structure, this type of process is 
a proxy for military service. As such, he says "that all Cameroonians who aspire to the 
public service should do the military service is a kind of volunteer and volunteer. They 
will become servants and not those who serve. 
At CRADEC, membership is subject to a file review and is conditional on the payment of 
membership fees of the association as is the case in most associations. 
These organizations maintain close relationships with grassroots citizens for awareness 
raising. They work "hand in hand" with them. This allows them to take into account all 
the desiderata or concerns of the said populations. For more efficiency and effectiveness 
in the work, they use traditional means of awareness such as posters, pamphlets, films, 
comics like the handbook of education in tax compliance in Cameroon prepared by 
CRADEC and Citizen Dynamics, films and TV movies as "the paradox of plenty" 
produced by the DMJ and CCPCQVP. In addition, there are other mechanisms for 
approaching citizens, such as the subsidiarity approach and the technical transfer of skills 
approach that make citizen’s independent to monitor the management of public finances. 
The YMD for example to reach the majority of young people has signed a partnership 
with the National Youth Council which is represented in approximately 336 
municipalities. His approach is a community approach. 
In addition, several of them have bodies such as the General Assembly and the Board of 
Directors. These are added to or added to other bodies such as the Office of the Auditor, 
the Directorate of Operations, Executive Board, Secretary General for others. The 
Executive Office, comparable to the Operations Department, usually includes a Program 
Coordinator who is elected for an average of 4 years, an Administrative and Financial 
Officer. Below these, there are the managers or program managers themselves assisted by 
assistants, the communication officer, the accountant, the support staff (secretary, drivers, 
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vigils and others). This is a mechanism to oversee the governance of the accounts and the 
management of the institution 
These leaders are both men and women. In other words, these CSOs take into account the 
gender aspect. This is also valid for field activities. According to the Executive Secretary 
of the DMJ, at least 30% of women are invited to the majority of activities for the 
conscious awakening of the citizens for the follow-up of the management of public 
finances in the mining sector notably the activities of sensitization and reinforcement of 
the capabilities. 
These are Christians for the most part. However the CSOs in which the "protest fiber" is 
very strong are those led by Protestant Christians. This is the case of the DMJ which is a 
movement from the evangelical movement. 
 
II. CSO Performance and Funding Mechanisms 
CSOs encountered in this study have legal legality. In other words, they are all 
recognized by the State and have legal documents like the statute, rules of procedure and 
a manual of administrative and financial procedures. This is the case of associations such 
as the Global Youth Dynamics, the African Regional Center for Endogenous and 
Community Development; non-governmental organizations such as the Network for the 
Fight Against Hunger (RELUFA), the Center for Environment and Development (CED), 
Transparency International-Cameroon. This indicates some coordination of activities and 
actions within these structures. In other words, these organizations are structured to a 
certain extent. This also highlights the "bureaucrat" dimension of CSOs in the country. 
GAMSON reveals that in most cases, social movements endowed with such an 
organization manage, in 71% of cases, to be recognized by their interlocutors against 
28% for less organized movements. 
The achievements of these various CSOs are numerous. For a better awareness, some 
CSOs organize "parliamentary dinners" which constitute a framework for exchanges 
between civil society actors, the rulers, and the representatives of the people. During 
these meetings, we also share experiences or present the results of the research. It is a 
good place to sensitize the people's elected representatives on the issues related to the 
management of financial resources from the exploitation of mineral resources. It is in this 
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context that the CED presented the fourteen (14) pillars to be taken into account in the 
reform of the mining code in force in the country. 
Others, to get young people interested in issues related to the extractive industries, realize 
on the one hand documentary films or telefilms, this is the case of TV movies called 
"memories of the pipeline" and "the minerals of the hope "realized by the RELUFA or 
the TV movie" the paradox of the abundance "realized by the DMJ and the CCPCQVP. 
This fourteen-minute TV movie educates young people on the EITI, the importance of 
mining revenues for local development. In this documentary, the people of the village of 
Bingala denounce the lack of transparency in the management of mining resources, the 
inertia and corruption of members of local development committees. They show that 
mining does not benefit the village. A resident of the village says I quote: 
 "My sister the situation in the village surprises me every day, not even drilling until we 
go for miles to bring drinking water to our children, not even a pipe to bring water back 
to our village [......], but I thought I had to find the solution I think it's the fault of Mr. 
Mandeng and his development committee who are not doing their job they promised 
since we met this company to know the contents of their contract and since the State 
delays to divulge these contracts, [......], you want to understand what my sister there is 
what to understand they know pertinently that by sending us the figures, the volumes , 
quantities, we will not understand anything in all that since no contract is published. 
They know it well, what do you want to understand? Huh? If they wanted us to 
understand, they would give us accurate information so that we the population can really 
appreciate things, if what the mining companies have promised to pay if they pay it 
entirely or if they are imposed any something that is not even calculated, [......] eh! Do 
not speak, let's just tap water » 
On the other hand to the production of comics relating for example to "fiscal 
responsibility for the public offices of the state and the right to basic public services". 
This with the aim of promoting civility and tax justice for optimal financing of the 
strategy for growth and employment in Cameroon in view of the emergence of the 
country. Specifically, it is a matter of informing, educating and communicating tax 
offenses and other malicious fiscal practices affecting tax revenues on the one hand and 
advocating for tax justice in the Cameroonian economy on the other. This production of 
CRADEC was realized thanks to the program of support of the Cameroonian civil 
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society. However, other means exist for tax education of citizens. For example, special 
emphasis could be placed on the training of certain categories of the population such as 
tradesmen and craftsmen, specialized journalists and campaigns in universities and 
schools, in other words. 
With regard to partnerships, survey results show that CSOs have two types of 
partnerships, namely technical and financial partnerships. With regard to financial 
partnerships, the results obtained from the field indicate that the national CSOs met or 
surveyed in this study receive funding from traditional partners such as the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, German Cooperation and the 
National Committee of the Netherlands (IUCN). These funds are generally managed 
according to the financial procedures defined in the procedures manual. As far as the 
DMJ is concerned, the funds are managed by the Executive Secretary. 
In order to obtain this funding, the Operational Director of CRADEC states that "it is 
necessary to develop complicities or maintain close relations with the TFPs. In addition, 
some of these partners technically assist these CSOs who work in synergy with local 
CSOs and international CSOs for greater effectiveness. This is the case of the European 
Union and German Cooperation through GIZ, which are strategic partners for these 
organizations. The synergy observed between national and local CSOs is considered 
necessary by each actor encountered because the pooling of efforts is the basis of any 
success in the context of demands, denunciations or mobilizations for change. 
This synergy is also observed during the events organized by the various CSOs. These do 
not make active mobilizations in other words of the mobilizations of street or mass. These 
are usually advocacy, and training workshops or parliamentary dinners. The assessment 
to date is satisfactory for all the civil society actors we met. Thanks to their actions, the 
governance of public finances in the extractive sector has been improved. 
These advances can be attributed to the internal governance of these CSOs. Because the 
working atmosphere that reigns at these structures is a friendly atmosphere, a good 
atmosphere; the interactions between the different members are harmonious; the 
management of the funds which come from the contributions of the members, the donors 
or the TFPs, is governed or supervised by a manual of financial and administrative 
procedures. 
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However, it must be recognized that these structures face difficulties in accessing funding 
because the own funds from membership fees are not sufficient, difficulties in accessing 
information; that they are not sufficiently equipped to conduct advocacy missions. The 
stakeholders we met believe that capacity building in this area is needed. 
In this wake, capacity-building workshops are regularly organized under the Civil Society 
Support Program (PASC) to increase their skills in the area of public finance in the 
extractive sector. According to official figures for the period 2012-2015, civil society 
organizations received subsidies of about 2 billion FCFA. It should be noted that during 
this period, about 3,000 Cameroonian civil society members benefited from training 
sessions or accompaniments and thematic capacity-building workshops. 
 Outside this program, there are other structures that contribute in the capacity building of 
civil society members to enhance their capacity to participate in social transformation 
alongside with the government. This is the case of EGIS through its support program for 
the structuring of civil society in Cameroon. We can also mention international 
organizations such as the World Bank, Transparency International-Cameroon, and the 
international organization of the Francophonie, which contribute to the development of 
organizational, institutional and technical capacities and the improvement of the 
operating framework of civil society. 
Specifically, the meetings organized within the framework of the PASC and, by the 
bilateral and multilateral partners of the Government allowed to build the participants, 
members of the CSOs on: 
 management and associative life; 
 regulations on transparency in the management of extractive industries; 
 understanding of the key technical concepts adopted at the international level; 
 completion of the declaration form for the production of the EITI report; 
 financial governance; 
 the rule of law and the democratization of access to the riches of the subsoil. 
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Apart from these workshops, these civil society companies periodically organize 
meetings or reflections on specific themes for sharing experiences. These meetings are 
both organized at the central level and deconcentrated, particularly in the regions. This is 
the case of the reflection on the effectiveness of local monitoring committees for 
payments and transfers between representatives of the CCPWP, the RETIE, traditional 
authorities and municipalities. 
In addition, these companies of the society take part in the workshops organized at the 
scale of Africa and the world scale. At the African level, civil society has participated in 
several workshops or forums on mining taxation. 
There is a particular emphasis on the job training at the expense of institutional training in 
training institutes or universities. This could be justified by the fact that these structures 
do not have enough financial resources to provide diploma training to any manager. In 
addition, the lack of a diploma course on the social and solidarity economy in state 
universities and institutes could also justify the choice on the job training, which is 
training provided by an expert in a company. 
III. Conclusion and Discussions 
At the end of this study, we note that several CSOs are mobilizing to improve 
transparency in the extractive industries. Among these are RELUFA, CED, DMJ, 
CRADEC, Transparency-International Cameroun and SNPJ which can be qualified as 
CSO leaders because of their professionalism and the actions they have undertaken since 
the beginning of the years. 2000. The latter are supported by other CSOs who joined the 
Cameroon Coalition Publish What You Pay (CCPCQVP) in December 2014. These 
companies, which, on the one hand, influence the choices of the government, despite the 
lack of professionalism, expertise and secondly, have some difficulties in resource 
mobilization, contribute to the improvement of transparency in the management of 
mining resources, particularly through the improvement of the regulatory framework. 
However, more structuring of this category of companies is needed. This would provide 
the country with a real group of demands and proposals for a transparent management of 
resources from the exploitation of the subsoil of the country for an emerging Cameroon 
and prosperous by 2035. 
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